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Article 3

President's Page

Phillip Becker and the Right to Privacy
If Screwtape 1 were writing letters in the 1970's, he might well
boast of the diabolical discovery of a constitutional "right to privacy."
Beginning with Griswold us. Connecticut, which has led to the virtual
displacement of parents by Planned Parenthood social engineers in the
influencing of adolescent sexual mores, the "right" which was undiscovered for almost two centuries has been carried to incredible
extremes by the Burger court. The right of privacy in abortion
decision-making has been carried far beyond the original excesses of
Roe us. Wade and Doe us. Bolton. Not only have parents lost their
right to participate in their children's decision-making, but husbands
have lost the privilege of influencing their own child's possibility of
survival, health departments have lost their right to regulate the performance of abortion, and, if the Dooling decision is sustained , Congress will have lost its right to disburse funds for abortion through the
Hyde Amendment.
Another locus for the "right to privacy" has been expounded by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Karen Quinlan case - the right
to privacy in refusing treatment. While no one would want to deny
any competent patient the right to refuse extraordinary care , the
precedent established by the Quinlan decision has some profoundly
disturbing implications for proxy consent. No one questions the sincerity or the good motivation of the Quinlan family, however the
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court transcends the circumstances of the Quinlan case. In effect, the court states that next of kin
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may exercise for incompetent patients a "constitutional right to
privacy." The danger of this solution is that it disenfranchises the
attending physician in those situations where the decision of the next
of kin may be lethal to the patient and where the medical treatment
recommended is neither extraordinary nor futile. This poses a formidable obstacle for any attending physician who may wish to retain
control over circumstances where near relatives may "want the patient
dead for the wrong reasons." 2 The famous Johns Hopkins case in
which surgery was denied for duodenal atresia because the patient had
Down's Syndrome is paradigmatic of this kind of situation. 3 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey did not say that the
attending physicians in the Quinlan case were wrong in applying the
standards of good medical practice. It did not even say that the lower
court was wrong in sustaining the physicians in their action. The Court
merely asserts that it will not be "bound or controlled" by medical
standards in intervening on behalf of a right to privacy. This judicial
tyranny is carried a step further by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Council in the Saikewicz case. In that decision the court said that
proxy decision-making for every incompetent in the state belonged
exclusively to the court and "that responsibility is not to be entrusted
to any other group purporting to represent the 'morality and conscience of our society,' no matter how highly motivated or impressively constituted." This decision now attempts to move life-and-death
decision-making away from family, physicians, or guardians and to
locate it as a matter of what amounts to judicial privacy. Here again,
the issue is not whether the court was or was not correct in recommending that Saikewicz (who was a 67 year old Down's Syndrome
patient in Belchertown State Hospital) should not receive chemotherapy for leukemia. In reaching that conclusion, the court was either
wrong or right for the wrong reasons.
It is perhaps too facile to see a logical progression from the Johns
Hopkins case to the New Jersey Supreme Court decision to the
position of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Council. All involved
proxy consent for incompetents and all involved serious implications
for the role of the physician in such decision-making. It is not merely
paranoid to see an erosion of the physician's contribution nor is it sufficient to point out that, in some instances, the physician has freely
abdicated his role to the court. This issue arises again in the Phillip
Becker case.
The case of Phillip Becker in California raises questions of great
poignancy. The medical facts are very difficult to weigh and both the
medical testimony and the judicial opinions raise profoundly disturbing questions. At issue was the question of whether Phillip, a 12
year old Down's Syndrome child, should have cardiac surgery for an
intraventricular septal defect. Since surgery had been delayed , the
child had developed pulmonary hypertension creating an expected
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mortality of about 5% for the procedure. The pediatric cardiologist, in
recommending th~ procedure, pointed out that Phillip was unusually
bright for a child with Down's Syndrome "falling into the top 5-10%
of such children in terms of educational potential." Phillip was
described as being able to feed and dress himself, fold laundry, feed
the cat, and make his bed. Without the surgery, he could be expected
to deteriorate in adolescence and to die by the third decade of life.
Although the indication for surgery cannot be said to be incontrovertible, the reasons presented in court for withholding surgery were
most unfortunate. A pediatrician (who was himself the father of a
retarded child) stated that he did not feel the surgery should be done
"with the goal of increasing the life expectancy of a life that I consider devoid of those qualities that give it human dignity." The similarity of language to that of early theorists of the Third Reich 4 is particularly unfortunate. Phillip's father, who emerges from the transcript
as a most anguished parent, testified under questioning that he
thought his son would be "better off dead than alive." His reason for
this conclusion was his fear that the child would be consigned to a
"warehouse institution" after his parents had died and were unable to
provide for quality care. This presumption of low standards of care for
the indigent retarded would be a very tragic element to be accepted
where life and death decisions were being made for the handicapped.
Facilities for ·t he care of the retarded have only recently emerged from
the bedlam-like standards of the 1940's and 1950's and it would be
regressive if a court were to accept as a "given," the notion that the
choice for institutionalized mental defectives is either death or life
under deplorable conditions.
A petition to make Phillip a ward of the Juvenile Court for the purpose of giving consent for the surgery was denied by Juvenile Court
Judge Eugene Premo. In oral remarks, he cited nearly plenary rights of
parents in denying consent. It would appear that Judge Premo, in reaching his decision, had required a higher standard of proof of the need for
surgery than what would have been applied to a situation involving a
juvenile of normal intelligence. The judge ruled that there was not
"clear and convincing" evidence that the surgery was needed and that
the child would survive and benefit from the operation. Attorneys for
the California Pro-Life Council pointed out that the usual standard
used in such cases involving juveniles was proof by "preponderance
of the evidence." A California appeals court, however, ruled that the
correct standard of proof had been used and that the 5-10% risk of
mortality was an "unreasonable " one.
It would be most unfortunate if this case should become a precedent for a double standard of proof. If it is concluded that a normal
person is allowed to take a higher risk than a handicapped child or
adult in a similar situation, then not only Phillip Becker but a whole
class of citizens have had their rights eroded.
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The recurrence of cases involving patients with Down's syndrome is
symptomatic of the diminished citizenship of such persons whether at
Johns Hopkins, in Belchertown, or in California in the case of Phillip
Becker. Some authors have described terms such as "sanctity of life"
or "worth of every individual" as "talismanic incantations" which
interfere with analysis and enlightenment. If we prescind from such
judgments, however, we are left with the unbelievably tortured circumlocution of those who have prejudged the quality of life of the
child or adult with Down's Syndrome. Killing the child with Down's
Syndrome in utero, after viability but before birth, becomes the "prevention" of Down's Syndrome in medical parlance. If we decide that
the Down's Syndrome patient should not survive because of his intellectual limitations, then therapy becomes his enemy and any potentially fatal disease becomes his friend. This is obvious in the commentary on Saikewicz in particular. We are told, for example,5 that if
his "leukemia is left undisturbed, Saikewicz will die relatively quickly
without pain or discomfort." When one reads such a statement, it is
questionable why we would ever want to treat any patient with
leukemia. Without belittling the complications of therapy, no one who
has spent any time on a busy hematology-oncology service would ever
describe death from leukemia in such sanguine, sugar-coated terms.
There are situations incontrovertibly where irrational vitalism has led
to the use of toxic modes of therapy in a manner which merely prolongs and exacerbates the dying process. These situations are the same
for the patient with Down's Syndrome as in the normal patient. It is
fair to say that Joseph Saikewicz could "understand" his therapy as
well as any two year old leukemic of normal intelligence and probably
" cooperate" as well in the carrying out of the therapy (that is to say,
to resist and react to all that is painful) . If we decide to withhold
therapy for Joseph Saikewicz, it is because he is like any other old
man for whom a transient remission is of questionable risk/benefit
indication. Similarly, the decision for surgery on Phillip Becker should
not be qualified by a suspicion that the society will not do right by
him if he happens to outlive his father. Phillip Becker will be denied
equal access to medical care unless his life is "sacred" and possessed of
irreducible value.
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